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DELAWARE'S CAPITAL JURY SELECTION: 
INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
AUTOMATIC DEATH PENALTY JURORS 
Adam M. Gershowitz* 
Like the other thirty-seven states that authorize capital punishment, Delaware 
has a bifurcated system whereby the guilt phases and the sentencing phases of capital 
trials are distinct and separate. I As in all other death-penalty states, after an individual's 
conviction, the final sentencers2 must entertain any evidence mitigating against [he im-
*J.D. Candidate, University of Virginia School of Law, Class of2001. B.A. University of 
Delaware, 1998. I would like to thank Thomas A. Foley for originally providing me with the 
opportunity to research this issue and Kenneth C. Haas for his continuing help and encourage-
ment. 
1. Su Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (I976) (affirming Georgia's modified capital 
punishment scheme, at least in part, because the guilt and sentencing phases had been bifurcated). 
The procedures upheld in Grtgg, especially the existence of a bifurcated trial, have remained, for 
the most part, integral requirements to the constitutionality of states' death-penalty statutes. Btlt 
su Marla Sandys, Th~ Capital jury Projm: Cross-Dvm-Capital jtlrors Who Change Th~ir Minds 
About th~ Punishmmt: A Litmus ust for Smtmcing Guide/in~s, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1220 (1995) 
(unfortunately noting that "although capital cases may be conducted as bifurcated proceedings, 
the majority of jurors reach their decisions about guilt and punishment at the same time - prior 
to the per.a1ty phase of the trial"). 
2. Of the 38 states that allow the imposition of capital punishment, 28 states place 
the sentencing decision in the hands of a juty. In four states - Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and 
Nebraska - juries do not participate in the sentencing phase and a judge determines a defendant's 
sentence. In another four states - Alabama, Delaware Florida, and Indiana - juries make sen-
tencing recommendations (0 judges who themselves make the final sentencing decisions. In Ne-
vada juries are vested with full sentencing authority, but a three-judge panel can overrule their 
decision. 
/' 
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position of the death penalty.3 During this phase, itself conducted like a mmHrial, 
sentencers weigh whether a convicted individual is deserving of the death penalty. Should 
the sentencers fail to find mitigating evidence, or should they determine that the mitigat-
ing evidence is insufficient to ourweigh the aggravating circumstances of the case,4 the 
defendant is likely to be sentenced to death. 
In most death-penalty states, jurors are the final fact-finders who weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence and undertake the powerful job of deciding whether 
to sentence an individual to life imprisonment or to death. 5 However, four states have a 
3. Mitigating evidence is that which reduces the defendant's culpability for the of-
fense . For instance, the fact that a defendant was mentally retarded or that he only participated in 
the crime in a minor way is mitigating evidence. Su Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) 
(requiring that "the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death" 
(footnote omitted». 
4. Su Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding a mandatory death 
sentence for situations in which the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances). Interestingly, Biyston~ is the only case in which the United States Supreme COUrt has 
upheld a mandatory death-penalty statute. For an example of an unconstitutional mandatory death-
penalty scheme see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down North 
Carolina's attempt to eliminate arbitrariness from capital sentencing by making the death penalty 
mandatory upon a first degree murder conviction). Su also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976) (striking down a similar law in Louisiana) . 
5. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that the right to a 
jury does not extend to the sentencing phase of capital trials. Su Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S . 504 
(1995); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (990); 
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Spaziano 
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). It is interesting to note, though, that despite the lack of a consti-
tutional requirement, 28 states vest the ultimate sentencing decision in the hands of a jury in 
capital cases. Additionally, four states - the focus of this article - ask jurors to make sentencing 
recommendations in capital cases. Considering that nearly all sentencing decisions in noncapital 
cases are left to judges, the fact that so many states involve juries in capital sentencing indicates 
that death really is "different." In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court noted that "the 
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of life imprisonment" and gave birth to 
the idea that capital sentencing must be undertaken with increased carefulness and concern. 428 
U.S. at 305. As such, the Court has, in some instances, enunciated strict requirements about the 
procedures utilized in capital cases based on the notion that "death is different." Interestingly, 
although the Supreme Court itself has declined to extend "death is different" jurisprudence to 
require states to afford jury participation at the sentencing phase of capital trials, most states have 
taken it upon themselves to determine that "death is different" by involving juries in the sentenc-
ing phase of capital trials. 
1999 Delaware's Capital Jury Selection 237 
slightly different capical punishment syscem: In Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indi-
ana, jurors scill undertake che difficulc cask of weighing aggravacing and micigacing evi-
dence, bue chey do so only in an advisory funccion. In chese four scaces, capical juries 
review che evidence for and againsc che deach penalcy and chen recommend a sentence.(, 
In chis respecc, jurors are scill intimacely cied co che sentencing decision; however, chey are 
not the final decision-makers. Thus, some mighc argue thac impaneling an impartial jury 
in the four "recommending" states is less important than impaneling an unbiased jury in 
the twenty-eight staces where jurors directly decide a defendant's sentence. This, however, 
could not be further from che truth. 
In actuality, selecting impartial jurors in the recommending states is of greater 
significance chan impaneling impartial jurors in the direct-decision scates. This is because 
a jury in the recommending staces need not be unanimous in recommending a sentence 
of deach,? with the result that non unanimous sentencing verdicts can range from eleven-
6. For a discussion of the structure of the sentencing procedures in these four states, 
see Jason c. Tran, Comment, Death by Judicial OVlrki/l: The Unconstitutionality of Overriding Jury 
Recommendations Against the Death Penalty, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 863, 867-77 (1997). 
7. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In fact, in Alabama, Delaware. 
Florida. and Indiana. a majority of jurors can recommend a sentence of life imprisonment only (0 
have a judge subsequently impose a death sentence. Su Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello. 
Death to Lift Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court. 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
196. 196 (1992) (noting that in Florida between the resurrection of capital punishment in 1976 
and 1992. 134 individuals were sentenced to death by judges in spite of jury recommendations for 
life sentences). Professor Radelet has asserted that jury overrides comprised 25% of F1orida's death 
sentences. Su Michael L. Radelet. Rejecting the Jury: Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida. 18 
U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 1409. 1412-13 (1985). In Alabama. as oflate 1994. judges had imposed death 
even after juries had recommended life imprisonment in 47 different cases. Su Harris v. Alabama. 
513 U.S. 504. 513 (1995) (citing the Alabama prison project). Judges in Indiana - through 1994 
- imposed death in eight cases in which juries had recommended life senrences. Su Harris. 513 
U.S. at 522 n.8 (Stevens. J .• dissenting) (citing a memorandum from the Indiana Public Defender 
Council). Of the four recommending states. only Delaware judges have declined (0 invoke their 
privilege to override a jury's recommendation for life in order to impose a death sentence. In 
Delaware. two seven-to-five jury recommendations in favor of the death penalty have resulted in 
judges imposing death sentences. Su Manley v. State. 709 A.2d 643 (Del. 1998). cm. denied. 119 
S. Ct. 214 (1998); Outten v. State. 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994). However. no death sentence has 
been imposed when less than a majority of the jury voted for death. The fact that Delaware judges 
have not overridden juries' majority votes for life seems to indicate that Delaware judges are more 
responsive to the recommendations of capital juries than judges in Alabama. Florida. and Indiana. 
The importance of this cannot be overstated and will become apparent as we discuss the need for 
more in-depth voir dire questions in Delaware. Su infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text. 
/ 
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to-one to six-to-six.8 In deciding whether to impose death, judges in the recommending 
states must look to these nonunanimous jury recommendations for guidance. The larger 
the number of jurors who vote for death, theoretically the more likely it becomes that a 
judge will sentence an individual to deathY A judge may therefore be more likely to 
impose a death sentence if seven of twelve jurors recommend death than if only six jurors 
recommend the death penalty. Thus, each juror's vote seems to count individually in the 
recommending states, rather than collectively as it does in the direct-decision states. If we 
assume that jurors in the recommending states count as "individuals" and if we further 
assume that judges base their sentencing decisions, at least in part, on the number of 
jurors who voted for death, then impaneling impartial jurors is crucial. 10 As a result, the 
process of death qualification II - making sure a juror is capable of voting for a sentence 
8. In Delaware a number of defendants have been sentenced to death after less than 
unanimous jury recommendations. See Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996) (11-1 jury vote 
for death), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171 (1997); Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) (11-1 jury 
vote for death); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994) (10-2 jury vote for death); Baker v. State, 
No. 360, 1992 (Del. Dec. 30, 1993) (9-3 jury vote for death); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 
(Del. 1994) (9-3 jury vote for death); Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994) (9-3 jury vote 
for death); Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998) (9-3 jury vote for death); State v. Barrow & 
Barnetr, Cr. A. No. IN97-02-1353, el al. (Del. Super. Feb. 3, 1998) (8-4 jury vote for death for 
both defendants); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996) (9-3 jury vote for death); Shelton v. 
State, 652 A.2d I (Del. 1995) (8-4 jury vote for death for both brothers) Stevenson v. State, 709 
A.2d 619 (Del.) (8-4 jury vote for death), em. denied, 119 S. Ct. 414 (1998); Outten, 650 A.2d 
1291 (7-5 jury vote for death); Manley, 709 A.2d 643 (7-5 jury vote for death). Weeks v. State, 632 
A. 2d 266 (Del. 1995) (10-2 jury vote for death). For a useful collection of all of the capital cases 
decided under Delaware's non-unanimous jury recommendation law, see Steven Church, Lift or 
Death, WILMINGTON NEWS J., Jan. 24, 1999, at AI. Most recently, Thomas Capano was sentenced 
to death after a jury voted 10-2 in favor of the death penalty. See Capano Sentenced to Die for 
Murder o/Mistress, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1999, at A3. 
9. Although this may not be true in Florida and, to some extent, Indiana and Ala-
bama' (see supra note 7), it does appear to be true in Delaware. Su infra notes 121-28 and accom-
panying text discussing the fact that Delaware judges have not imposed a death sentence unless a 
majority of the jury voted for death. 
10. But su Radelet & Mello, supra note 7, at 196 noting that in Florida, even where 
juries have recommended life imprisonment by large majorities, even unanimous recommenda-
tions, judges have nevertheless imposed death. 
I J. See Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510. 523 n.21 (1968) (holding that jurors 
can be excused for cause from capital trials if they would automatically vote against the death 
penalty or if their atritudes would keep them from making an impartial decision about the defendant's 
guilt). See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text explaining the Witherspoon decision. 
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of death - and life qualification l2 - a process ensuring that a juror is capable of consid-
ering life imprisonment instead of automatically voting for the death penalty - is even 
more important in the recommending states than in the twenty-eight death-penalty states 
where juries have the fInal say as to a defendant's punishment but must be unanimous in 
order to impose the death penalty. 
This article primarily analyzes life qualification in Delaware. Part I reviews the 
key United States Supreme Court decisions addressing death and life qualification. Part 
II then analyzes the existing social science research on the prevalence of automatic-death-
penalty (adp) jurors (jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty irrespec-
tive of the mitigating evidence and who should be eliminated from the jury pool through 
life qualification) . After reviewing the Supreme Court's rationale for disallowing adp ju-
rors and the social science data estimating their prevalence in society, Part III of this 
article examines voir dire questioning in Delaware and assesses the success of that ques-
tioning in eliminating adp jurors. Part IV then critically analyzes ManLey v. State,l.\ the 
Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision refusing to mandate more expansive voir dire. 
Part V of this article discusses the need and constitutional basis for more in-depth voir 
dire to eliminate adp prospective jurors. Finally, Part VI focuses on the potentially deadly 
role adp jurors can play in the four states, particularly Delaware, where jurors may recom-
mend a sentence of death. 14 
12. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 u.s. 719, 735-736 (1992) (holding that a capital defen-
dant is enti tled to ask prospective jurors if they would automatically vote for the death penalty if 
they found the defendant guilty) . Su infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text detailing the Mor-
gan decision. 
13. 709 A.2d 643. 
14. This article does not criticize the statutory schemes of Alabama, Delaware, Florida, 
and Indiana that allow judges to override jury votes for life. For such an indictment see Raddet & 
Mello, supra note 7, at 204-05. Though this is undoubtedly an important issue. it has been omit-
ted from analysis here because to this date there has not been a life-to-death override in a Delaware 
capital trial. Delaware is unique in that it is the only "recommending" state in which a life-to-death 
override has not occurred. 
240 Delaware Law Review Volume Il:2 
I. FROM WITHERSPOONTO MORGAN 
The Supreme Court's first major statement on the problems of pro- or anti-
death-penalty bias in capital cases came in 1968 in Witherspoon v. Illinois,15 four years 
before the Court's landmark Furman decision. If> Leading up to Furman, support for the 
death penalty in America had dropped to an all-time low; support for capital punishment 
hovered just below the fifty-percent benchmark l ? and was in fact part of the Court'S 
rationale in Furman v. Georgia for holding all existing death-penalty laws to be' unconsti-
tutional. lK At issue in Witherspoon was whether prospective jurors who had qualms about 
the death-penalty could be excused for cause from serving on a capital jury.19 In Illinois, 
a statute provided that "[iJn trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror 
15. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
16. In F'lrman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), a deeply splintered Court held all 
then-existing death-penalty laws to be unconstitutional because they were arbitrary, capricious, 
and discriminatory in that they provided no statutory guidance to help judges and juries to choose 
between life and death. The Court's rationale - that the arbitrariness of the death-penalty laws 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment - engendered 
a tremendous amount of criticism, especially in light of the fact that the Court had failed to corne 
to such a conclusion a year earlier in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), a case in which 
the Court declined to find that the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty violated the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the general public's support for the death 
penalty dropped below 50% and no one had been executed in the United States since 1967, the 
response to Furman was swift. Thirty-five states promptly redrafted their death-penalty laws and 
the Supreme COUrt then upheld Georgia's law (along with Florida's and Texas' capital punishment 
schemes) as a model in 1976. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
17. Just prior to Withmpoon, support for the death penalty fell to its all-time nadir: 
42% in 1966. Obviously, the American public has undergone an overwhelming change of opinion 
since the Witherspoon/Furman era. For a thorough analysis of societal ani tudes toward capital pun-
ishment see ROBERT M. BOHM, American DMth Ptnalty Opinion: Past, Prestnt, and FIINlre, in 
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND Fu-
TURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker et aI. eds., 1998) . See also Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardtning of the Attitlldes: America's Views on the Death Ptnalty, 50 
J. SOC. ISS UES 19 (1994). 
18. See mpra note 16. 
19. Withmpoon, 391 U.S. at 513. 
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who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital 
punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."20 This language enabled the prosecutor 
to eliminate all prospective jurors who had qualms or scruples about the death penalty 
from sitting in Witherspoon's case. In total, forty-seven jurors were eliminated because of 
their views on the death penalty,21 even though only five of them stated that they would 
be unable to vote for the death penalty under any circumstances.22 Witherspoon con-
tended that the jury selection procedure in his case should be held unconstitutional be-
cause it biased the jury in favor of both conviction and a death sentence. 23 The petitioner 
argued that by eliminating all potential jurors with qualms about the death penalty, the 
prosecutor was "stacking the deck" against him. First, Witherspoon maintained that a 
jury devoid of individuals with scruples against the death-penalty was more likely to 
convict because death penalty opponents would be less conviction prone. 24 Witherspoon 
attempted to buttress his claim with a few unpublished studies.25 The Court, however, 
concluded that his proof was "too tentative and fragmentary" to demonstrate that a death-
qualified jury was biased toward convicting the defendant26 and refused to decide whether 
death qualification biased the jury in favor of convictionY However, the Court did con-
20. Jd. at 512 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 28. § 743 (1959). 
21. !d. at 514. 
22. Jd. 
23. !d. at 516-18. 
24 . !d. at 517. 
25. Su id. at 517 n.l0. Two studies were surveys of college students. A third study 
utilized 1.248 interviews with jurors and concluded that a jury without individuals opposed to the 
death penalty would be more likely to convict. 
26. !d. at 517-18. 
27. Although the Court in Witherspoon refused to decide whether death qualification 
has a biasing effect. the Court ultimately agreed to consider this question in Lockhart II. McCru. 
476 U.S. 162 (1986). In McCree the Court outrightly rejected the contention that death qualifica-
tion biases the jury in favor of conviction even in the face of more recent impressive scholarly 
research. Su Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth. Due Prows liS. Crime Control: Death Quali-
fication and jllry Attitudes. 8 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) (finding that death-qualified survey 
respondents were more conviction prone). Su also Claudia L. Cowan. et a!.. The Efficts o/Predispo-
sition to Conllict on the Qllality o/Deliberation. 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) (reporting statis-
tically significant findings that death-qualified sample juries are more likely to convict than sample 
juries which included Witherspoon excludables). 
/ 
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c1ude that the Illinois jury-selection procedure violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments with regard to the sentencing phase. 28 
In light of the fact that half of the population opposed capital punishment, 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that a jury selection procedure that 
eliminated virtually everyone with opposition to capital punishment did not express the 
community's conscience. 29 According to Justice Stewart, "In its quest for a jury capable of 
imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn 
a man to die."30The Court reversed Witherspoon's sentence31 and noted in a footnote, as 
guidance for future cases, that prospective jurors could be excused for cause if they would 
automatically vote against the death penalty or if their attitudes would keep them from 
making an impartial decision about the defendant's guilt.32 
Justice Black, writing in dissent, contended that "the real holding in [Witherspoon 1 
is, at least to me, very ambiguous. "33 Justice Black saw no discernible difference between 
asking prospective jurors if they have conscientious scruples against the infliction of capi-
tal punishment and asking them if they would automatically vote against the death pen-
alty.34 
Despite Justice Black's contention that Witherspoon was unclear, the Court's next 
significant decision about death qualification did not come until twelve years later in 
28. Withmpoon, 391 U.S. at 518. 
29. [d. at 519. 
30. !d. at 520-21. 
31. [d. at 523. 
32. [d. at 523 n.21. 
33. !d. at 538 (Black, J., dissenting). Interestingly, although Justice Black argued that 
the Court's Witherspoon decision was unclear, in retrospect, Witherspoon proved to be the most 
lucid of the Court's death-qualification opinions. See infra note 43 and accompanying text discuss-
ing how Adams v. uxas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), dras-
tically departed from the clarity of Witherspoon. 
34. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 538 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Adams v. Texas,35 a case involving the Texas capital sentencing scheme.36 In Adams, the 
Court departed from Witherspoon's command that jurors only be excluded if it was un-
mistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the death penalty. The Adams 
Court instead determined that a juror could be excused for cause if his views would 
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath. "37 The Adams decision was a substantial departure 
from the more inclusive Witherspoon holding. Possibly because of the great difference 
between the language in Adams and Witherspoon, the Court decided to hear another death-
qualification case, Wainwright v. Witt, 3" only five years after Adams. 
After reviewing the differing language in Adams and Witherspoon, Justice 
Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Witt, determined that the language in Adams was 
preferable.39 Justice Rehnquist explained that, in addition to being dicta, the statements 
in Witherspoon requiring unmistakable clarity that a juror would automatically vote against 
35. 448 U.S. 38 (\980). 
36. The Texas scheme - upheld by the Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S. 262 
(\976) - requires jurors to answer three questions at the sentencing phase: First. jurors are asked 
whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed delib-
erately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or defendant would 
result. Second. jurors must answer whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Finally. jurors decide 
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response [0 any 
provocation. if any. by the deceased. The second part of this three-part question in Texas - fumre 
dangerousness - has been the subject of much debate by capital punishment scholars. Some 
scholars suggest that fumre dangerousness is extremely difficult to predict. See James W. Marquart 
et aI .• Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurauly P"dict Dangaousnm in Capital Cases? 23 
L. & Soc 'y REV. 449. 464 (\989) (noting that "predicting future dangerousness appears [0 depart 
little from gazing into a crystal ball when it comes to determining the fate of capital offenders"). 
The issue of future dangerousness is particularly relevant to the adp question. Experts may testifY 
at the sentencing ph3se of capital trials to the fact that a defendant would pose a future risk to 
society should he be allowed to live. Adp jurors. already inclined to impose the death penalty. 
would not hesitate to accept this testimony, thus neglecting their duty to scrutinize the aggravating 
circumstances. in this case testimony by an expert that the defendant is potentially dangerous. 
37. Adams. 448 U.S. at 45 . 
38. 469 U.S. 412 (\985). 
39. !d. at 421. 
244 Delaware Law Review Volume II:2 
the death penalty were unwise,4° because "many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough 
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 'unmistakably clear."'41 There-
fore, the Court held that the more flexible language in Adams allowing exclusion of a 
juror whose views would "prevent or substantially impair his duties as a juror in accor-
dance with his instructions or his oath" should be the governing standard for death quali-
fication. 42 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that this standard lacked clarity,4.1 but he claimed 
that the discretion to determine whether a juror was unable to fulfill her duties was better 
left to the trial judge, rather than to a rigid standard.44 
Although the Witt standard was less clear than the Witherspoon language, it is 
obvious that Witt made it easier to excuse prospective jurors with some degree of opposi-
tion to the death penalty.4~ Whereas a challenge for cause under Witherspoon required 
40. !d. at 422-25. 
41. Id. at 424-25. 
42. !d. at 425. 
43 . Although Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Witt standard lacked clarity, 
this issue was seemingly brushed aside. Undoubtedly, the opaque standard in Witt is less lucid than 
the Withaspoon standard requiring that it be unmistakably clear that a juror would automatically 
vote against the death penalty. One scholar has pointed out that "Witt fails woefully to determine 
who could and who could not perform the duties of a juror." See Marla Sandys, Stacking the Dtck 
for Guilt and Death: Tht Failurt of Dtath Qualification to Enmrt Impartiality, in AMERICA'S EXPERI-
MENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTI-
MATE PENAL SANCflON 285, 290 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sandys, Stacking tht 
Dt:ekl . As such, in retrospect, it seems that Justice Black, dissenting in Withtrspoon, was unduly 
harsh in condemning the lack of clarity in the Withmpoon standard, for that standard was consid-
erably more clear than the language promulgated in Adams and reiterated in Witt. 
44 . Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26. 
45. See Sandys, Stacking tht Dt:ek, mpra note 43, at 289 stating that' " Witt relaxes the 
standard, thereby increasing the range of prospective jurors who may be dismissed from serving on 
a capital case." In dissent in Witt, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the 
Coun had misinterpreted Adams. According to Justice Brennan, "Nothing in Adams suggests that 
the Court intended to abandon Withmpoon's strict standards of proof." Witt, 469 U.S . at 451 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) . According to Justice Brennan, the Witt Court misinterpreted Adams to 
establish "an entirely new standard significantly more lenient than that of Withtrspoon '" [whichl 
.. . no longer prohibits exclusion of uncertain, vacillating, or ambiguous prospective jurors." !d. at 
452 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
1999 Delaware's Capital Jury Selection 245 
"unmistakable clarity"46 to eliminate a prospective juror, under Witt a judge may excuse 
jurors if they are "substantially impaired"~7 from carrying out their duties. 
In addition to revising the standard for those jurors who could never impose the 
death penalty, Wainwright v. Witt insinuated that a juror could also be "substantially im-
paired" if she would automatically impose the death penalty. Three years later, in Ross v. 
Oklahoma,48 the Court broached this issue of automatic-death-penalty, or adp, jurors. At 
issue in Ross was an Oklahoma trial court's decision refusing to remove for cause a juror 
who declared that he would automatically vote for the death penalty should the defen-
dant be found guilty.49 This juror was eventually removed from the vmire via a peremp-
tory challenge.5o The Supreme Court, although finding a constitutional error in the Court's 
failure to remove this juror, denied Ross relief because the juror, excused by a peremptory 
challenge, had not actually sat for the case.51 The Court did note, though , that "had [the 
juror] sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death . .. the sentence would 
have to be overturned. "52 
The Court's statement on automatic-death-penalty jurors in Ross was merely 
dicta. The adp issue arose again, however, and the Court had the opportunity to rule on 
the subject four years later in Morgan v. Illinois. 53 During jury selection in his capital trial, 
Derrick Morgan sought to have the judge ask prospective jurors, "If you found Derrick 
Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what 
the facts are?"54 The State of Illinois did not dispute Morgan's Contention that adp jurors 
46. Withmpoon. 391 U.S. at 523 n.21. 
47. Witt. 469 U.S. at 425. 
48. 487 U.S. 81 (1988) . 
49. !d. at 83 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 86. 
52. Id. at 85. 
53. 504 U.S. 719 (1992) . 
54. Morgan. 504 U.S. at 723. 
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should not be allowed to sit in capital trials. The State did claim, however, that it did not 
need to ask Morgan's question because other questions, inquiring whether jurors could be 
fair and impartial and whether they could "follow the law," were sufficient. 55 
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument. Justice White, speak-
ing for the Court, first noted that while refusing to ask Morgan's adp question, the State 
did request questioning under Withmpoon and Witt to identify jurors who would never 
impose the death penalty. 56 Clearly, Justice White concluded, Illinois was more eager to 
identify jurors who would never impose the death penalty than to identify jurors who 
would automatically impose the death penalty. Justice White also disputed the State's 
contention that questioning whether jurors would "follo~ the law" was sufficient to iden-
tify bias. "Witherspoon and its succeeding cases," he declared, "would be in large measure 
superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries could detect those 
jurors with views preventing or substantially impairing their duties in accordance with 
their instructions and oath."57 Thus, the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant is 
entitled to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death 
penalty if the defendant were found guilty.58 
The rationale behind the Court's decision was that a petitioner must be able to 
"exercise intelligently his complementary challenge for cause against those biased persons 
on the venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death after a finding of guilt. "59 
The Morgan Court continued by noting that "[a] defendant on trial for his life must be 
55 . [d. 
56. [d. at 734. 
57. !d. at 734-35. Su infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text explaining that just as 
a question asking if jurors could "follow the law" is inadequate to assess jurors' views on the impo-
sition of capital punishment, a single question asking if a juror would automatically vote for the 
death penalty is similarly inadequate. 
58. [d. at 739. 
59 . Jd. at 733. 
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permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors [would automatically 
impose the death penaltyj."(.o 
In dissent, Justice Scalia61 argued that the Morgan majority used flawed logic in 
holding that adp jurors cannot sit on juries and that defendants have the right to probe 
for jurors' tendencies to automatically impose the death penalty. Specifically, Justice Scalia 
disagreed with the Court's rationale that an adp juror would be unwilling to consider any 
mitigating evidence and would thus be excludable for that reason. Justice Scalia argued 
that the legacy of cases extending from Lockett v. Ohio62 did not require that jurors63 must 
consider any mitigating evidence, but rather only that they must not be precluded from 
doing so. As such, under Justice Scalia's reasoning, a juror unwilling to consider mitigat-
ing evidence because of her adp status need not be excluded.64 
60. [d. at 735-36. The imporcance of the strength of the Court's language guaranteeing 
defendants the right to probe prospective jurors for their inclinations to automatically impose the 
death penalty should not be underestimated. In addition to utilizing phrases such as "exercise 
intelligently" and "ascertain." the Court also stated that a defendant has the right to "inquiry 
discerning those jurors who, even prior to the State's case in chief. had predetermined [that they 
would impose the death penalty] ." !d. at 736. Su infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text 
explaining that a defendant must be afforded in depth 1)oir dire questions in order to "intelligently" 
"ascertain" and "discern" which jurors would automatically impose the death penalty. 
61. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 
62. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) . In Lockm the Court held that jurors 
must not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. [d. at 604. 
63 . Justice Scalia, in addition to citing a plethora of cases aimed at buttressing his 
conclusion that jurors need only be permitted to hear mitigating evidence. also cited cases in 
which judges were not compelled to consider mitigating evidence. Su Morgan. 504 U.S. at 745 
(Scalia. J .• dissenting) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S . 393 (1987». According to Justice 
Scalia, "[W]here the judge is the final sentencer we have held, not that he must consider mitigating 
evidence, but only that he may not, on legal grounds, refuse to consider it ." !d. at 745 (Scalia. J .• 
dissenting). This statement makes little sense. If a judge cannot refuse to consider mitigating evi-
dence then, contrary to Justice Scalia's logic, he must consider such evidence. Justice Scalia's erro-
neous logic thus tends to belie his earlier argument that adp jurors need not consider mitigating 
evidence and hence can legitimately serve on capital juries. Set: infra note 64 explaining this point. 
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Even assuming adp jurors could legally be excluded, Justice Scalia continued, he 
saw no reason why such jurors should not "be identified by more general questions con-
cerning fairness and willingness to follow the law."r.5 Finally, Justice Scalia claimed that 
expansive questions to eliminate adp jurors are not as necessary as questions to identify 
jurors who would never impose death.r.r. The reason for this, according to Justice Scalia, is 
that in a state like Illinois where unanimity is required for a death sentence to be imposed, 
"[al single death penalty opponent can block [the death penalty], but 11 unwavering 
advocates cannot impose it."r.7 In other words, Justice Scalia argued that the unanimity 
64. Although Justice Scalia is able to offer numerous quotes purporting to indicate that 
failure to consider mitigating evidence is not grounds for exclusion of prospective jurors. his quo-
tations ignore the prevailing view that jurors are expected to be impartial. Moreover. Justice Scalia's 
argument violates the spirit of Lockett v. Ohio and its progeny. Lockett stands for the principle that 
jurors sit at the penalty phase to consider mitigating evidence; it states directly that a jury must 
"not be precluded from considering [mitigating evidence]." Lockm, 438 U.S . at 604. However, 
contrary to Justice Scalia's contention, impanelling jurors who would automatically vote for death 
in effect precludes them from considering any mitigating evidence. If jurors need nor consider 
mitigating evidence, then what would be the point of the Court's many decisions mandating that 
mitigating evidence may not be excluded from capital sentencing proceedings? No doubt, a hy-
pothetical situation in which a state prohibited jurors from hearing mitigating evidence unless 
they requested to hear such evidence would not pass constitutional muster. As such, Justice Scalia's 
parallel contention that jurors need not consider mitigating evidence does not square with the 
Court's jurisprudence on this question. 
65 . Morgan, 504 U.S . at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) . Justice Scalia's statement demon-
strates a lack of awareness of the way jurors answer questions at voir dire and, more importantly, an 
ignorance of the existing social science data that indicates that vague questions such as "will you 
follow the law?" are gravely insufficient to identify and eliminate adp jurors. Justice Scalia's lack of 
concern for the existing social science data is not surprising given his judicial philosophy and his 
statements in earlier cases. Writing for the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky. 492 U.S. 361. 378 (1989). 
to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty for 16- and 17 -year-olds. Justice Scalia acerbically 
remarked that in legal battles "socioscientific. ethnioscientific. or even purely scientific evidence is 
not an available weapon ." For a discussion of the recent lack of regard for empirical research in 
capital cases see James R. Acker. A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evi-
dence, and Capital Punishment Decisions. 1986-1989.27 L. & SOC'y REV. 65 (1993) . Su also Craig 
Haney & Deanna Dorman Logan. Broken Promise: The Supreme Courts Response to Social Science 
Rmarch on Capital Punishment. 50 J. Soc . ISSUES 75 (1994); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan 
D. Casper, Empirical Evidence and the Death Penalty: Past and Future. 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 177 (1994) . 
66. Morgan. 504 U.S. at 750 (Scalia. J .• dissenting) . 
67. Jd. (Scalia. J .. dissenting) . 
1999 Delaware's Capital Jury Selection 249 
requirement in most death-penalty states enables a single juror's opposition to the death 
penalty in all cases to inhibit the other jurors from sentencing a defendant to death. while 
at the same time eleven adp jurors could not institute a death sentence because one single 
juror could stand in their way.68 
II. THE PREVALENCE OF ADP JURORS: 
WHAT SOCIAL SCIENCE TELLS US 
The prevalence of adp jurors has always been somewhat of a mystery. The first 
social science attempt to ascertain the percentage of people who would automatically 
impose the death penalty was undertaken by Kadane in 1984.69 Kadane found that one 
percent of the population was likely to be adp/o indicating that only a fairly small per-
centage of society would automatically vote to impose the death penalty. Three years 
later, however, the publication of twO studies raised serious doubts about the validity of 
this conclusion. A study by Nieses and Dillehay found that 24.1 % of registered voters 
surveyed were classifiable as adp.71 In the same journal that published the Nieses and 
Dillehay study. research by Nietzel, Dillehay, and Himelein was also published.72 Al-
though this research did not focus on adp's, it did determine that. in the course of eigh-
teen capital trials, 25.8% of removals for cause favorable to the defendant occurred be-
cause the prospective jurors were adp/3 Obviously, the findings of these two studies dif-
68. Justice Scalia's logic does not hold in the four states - Alabama. Delaware. Florida. 
and Indiana - where capital juries recommend sentences. Su infra text accompanying notes 119-
28 explaining how a single adp juror can potentially affect the outcome of a sentencing decision in 
these four "recommending states." 
69. Joseph Kadane. Afur Hovry: A Nou on Taking Acco/mt ofthl Arttomatic DMth Pm-
alty Juror. 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 115 (1984). 
70. !d. at 116. 
71 . Michael L. Nieses & Ronald C. Dillehay. Dlath Qualification and Conviction Pron(-
nm: Witt and Withmpoon CompaY(d. 5 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 479. 485 (1987). 
72. Michael1~ Nietzel (t at .• Efficts of Voir DiY( Variations in Capital Trials: A R(ptica-
tion and Exunsion. 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467 (1987) . 
73. [d. at 73. The 18 capital trials occurred in Kentucky. South Carolina. and Califor-
nia. 
/ 
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fered markedly from the Kadane study: the two new studies seemed to indicate that adp's 
were extremely prevalent in society. Moreover, this conclusion was buttressed by a 1983 
Harris survey that found twenty-seven percent of the respondents to be adp.74 
Any consensus within the social science community that the prevalence of adp's 
was in the mid-twenty-percent range instead of the one- to two-percent range was dashed 
seven years later upon the publication of another adp study. In 1994, Haney and col-
leagues surveyed about five hundred California residents and determined that only 2.6% 
were adp.75 The Haney study suggested that the more recent high estimates of adp's were 
erroneous. However, on the heels of the Haney study, the most recent adp study by Dillehay 
and Sandys76 contrasted the preceding work and found the highest percentage of adp's to 
date. Dillehay and Sandys found that using the "prevent or substantially impair" lan-
guage delineated in Wainwright 11. Witt (prior to the advent of Morgan) failed to identify 
42 individuals, 28.2% of the respondents, who were adp.77 Moreover, the study found 
that two other adp respondents were correctly identified by the Witt questions,7H thus 
bringing the total number of adp's to 44 in a sample of 148. The Dillehay and Sandys 
study therefore found that 29.7% of those surveyed were adp. 
A consensus among these five studies is noticeably absent. Two studies indicate 
that the percentage of adp's is fairly low, perhaps no higher than one to three percent of 
the population.79 However, three of the studies place the prevalence of adp's significantly 
74. Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., study no. 12 (Feb. 10, 1983). 
75. Craig Haney et aI., "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on its Biasing Efficts. 
18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 619. 624-25 (1994). 
76. Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys. Lift Under Wainwright v. Witt: juror Dis-
positions and Death Qualification. 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147 (1996). 
77. !d. at 159. 
78. Id. at 160. 
79. Su supra notes 69-70 and 75. 
1999 Delaware's Capital Jury Selection 251 
higher, anywhere from twenty-four percent to thirty percent. KU Although we cenainly 
cannot conclude with certainty that twenty-four to thirty percent of the population is 
adp,KI we also cannot dismiss the possibility that so many adp's do in fact exist. This 
possibility appears more troubling when we consider that the existing limited voir dire 
questions used in Delaware are both ineffective and insufficient to eliminate adp's. 
III. CAPITAL VOIR DIRE IN DELAWARE 
Questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire is the attorney's primary op-
ponunity to detect bias. K2 In Delaware, a number of questions are asked during voir dire. 
80. Su supra notes 71-73 and 76-78. Another large-scale study - The Capital Jury 
Project, a study of juror attitudes in 11 different states - though not specifically calculating adp 
percentages, did find an alarming rate of jurors predisposed to impose a penalty before any evi-
dence had been heard at the penalty phase. Su William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing 
Lift or Dt:ath: St:ntt:ncing Dynamics in Capital Caw, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAl. SANCTION 309 
(James R. Acker et aI. eds., 1998). The Capital Jury Project found that 48.3% of jurors thought 
that they knew what the appropriate punishment should be before hearing any evidence at the 
sentencing phase. Equally problematic was the fact that 64.1 % of those respondents were "abso-
lutely convinced" that they had determined the correct sentence prior to the sentencing phase. /d. 
at 325. For the purposes of this article it is also interesting to note that in one of the many capital 
jury studies, researchers found about 25% of jurors in the study believed that the death penalty 
was mandatory when it in fact was not. Su James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital 
St:ntt:ncing Instructions: Guidt:d or Misguidt:d?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1173 (1995). 
81. It is in fact possible that telephone surveys and interviews overestimate the percent-
age of adp's. However, while this is possible, it is equally plausible that the reverse effect occurs in 
actual lJoir dirt: situations. Su Valerie P. Hans, Dt:ath by Jury. in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES at 153 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi, cds., 
1988), noting that "[ilt is one matter to tell friends or an interviewer that one is for or against 
capital punishment, and another affair entirely to speculate in the formal setting of the courtroom 
about whether or not one could render a death sentence." The possibility exists that individuals are 
much more honest about their attitudes toward the death penalty when they are answering ques-
tions on the phone or face-to-face with a single interviewer, while they are much more reticent 
about revealing their pro-death-penalty predilections in front of a judge. 
82. Although experienced practitioners are able to form conclusions about potential 
bias through questionnaire data, physical appearance, and body language, nearly all practitioners 
would agree that probing questions put to prospective jurors during jury selection provide the 
most insight into potential biases. 
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Unfortunately, these questions are both ineffective and insufficient to detect a prosp.ec-
tive juror's inclination to automatically impose the death penalty. Consider the following 
hypothetical exchange between a trial judge and a prospective juror:83 
Judge: Since one of the possible sentences in this case is death, we must 
know if you hold any view on capital punishment that would prevent 
you from performing your duty as a juror under the law. These ques-
tions are not meant to suggest what the verdict or sentencing recom-
mendation should be in this case.H4 The jury will determine the proper 
verdict based on the evidence presented in the trial and, if necessary, 
will also determine the proper sentencing recommendation in light of 
the facts and circumstances of the case. Do you have any bias or preju-
dice either for or against the state or the defendant? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
Judge: Is there any reason why you cannot give this case your undi-
vided attention and render a fair and impartial verdict? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
Judge: Have you formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant in this case as a result of what you read or heard through the 
news media or discussed with anyone else? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
83. The questions excerpted in this example are the actual questions utilized in capital 
voir dirt in Delaware. 
84. Although the judge states that inquiring about capital punishment attitudes is not 
meant to suggest the verdict or the sentence, social science has demonstrated that it does. Su 
Craig Haney, On th( S(/mion ofCapita/juri(s: Th( Biasing Effiets ofth( DMth-Qua/ification Pro-
em, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984). In a controlled study Professor Haney found that "expo-
sure to death qualification increased subjects belief in the guilt of the defendant and their esti-
mate that he would be convicted . .. [alnd it led the jurors to choose the death penalty as an 
appropriate punishment much more frequently than persons not exposed to it." !d. at 128-29. 
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Judge: Would anything you read or heard about this case through the 
news media or elsewhere make it difficult for you to render a fair and 
impartial decision in the case, based on the evidence introduced at the 
trial and the instructions given you by the Court? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
Judge: Do you have any religious, conscientious, or other opposition 
to the death penalty?85 
Prospective Juror: No, I am not opposed to the death penalty. 
Judge: Do you believe that anyone who is convicted of murder in the 
first degree should automatically be given the death penalty regardless 
of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of the 
Court'S instructions on the law? 
Prospective Juror: No, I would not automatically vote for the death 
penalty. 
Judge: If you found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, 
would you automatically vote in favor of the sentence of death irre-
spective of the facts or the Court's instructions of law? 
253 
85 . Should a prospective juror answer in the affirmative to this question, Delaware 
provides for four in-depth fo llow-up questions. Prospective jurors arc asked: 
Would your opinion, beliefs, or opposition to the death penalty prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of your duries as a juror to decide the 
facts impartially in accordance WIth your oath? Would your opinions. beliefs 
or opposition to the death penalty prevent or substantially impair the perfor-
mance of your duties as a juror to conscientiously apply the law as charged by 
the court in accordance with your oath? Would you be able to recommend the 
death penalty at the end of the penalty hearing if the law and evidence so 
permits , regardless of your feelings regarding tlie death penalty? In spite of 
your opinions and beliefs regarding the death penalty, could you nevertheless 
recommend the death penalty at the end of the penalty hearing if the evidence 
so permits, knowing that such a determination could influence the Court in 
deciding what sentence to impose upon the defendant? 
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Prospective Juror : No. As I said before , I would not automatically vote 
for the death penalty. 
Judge: Thank yo u very much. Do either the prosecut ion or the defense 
wish to use a peremptory chall enge? 
Prosecutor: No, your honor. 
Defense: No, your honor. 
Judge: You have been impaneled as a juror in this case. 
Altho ugh the juror in this hypothetical situation clai med that she would not 
automatically vote for the death penalty, we cannot be sure, with any reasonable degree of 
certainty, that this is true . The reason for this is two-fo ld. 
First, the judge began his address to the potential jurors by stating that "s ince 
one of the possible sentences in this case is dea th , we must know if you hold any view o n 
cap ital punishment that would prevent you from performing your duty as a juror under the 
law." This statement, either overtly or subconsciously, is a signal to prospective jurors that 
there are right and wrong answers to the questions that they are abo ut to be asked. In 
essence, the judge's statement suggests that should prospective jurors answer incorrectly 
there is something wrong with them. Thus, before any questions have even been asked, a 
social norm has been established whereby there are co rrect, socially acceptable answers to 
the forthcoming questions and incorrect answers that would stigmatize a prospective ju-
ro r as unfit to perform the duties of a juror that all citizens are supposed to be able to 
perform. 
T he problem of the judge's preliminary leading statement is compounded by 
the nature of the voir dire questions themselves. Eve n if prospective jurors do not implic-
itly believe that there are right and wrong answers after hearing the judge's opening state-
ment, they almost certainly will come to believe that there are ri ght and wrong answe rs as 
they hear the subsequent questions. By the end of voir dire - the point at which the adp 
questions are asked - prospective jurors have already given a string of "no" answers if 
they have answered "correctly." After having answered "no" to this ser ies of questions, 
prospect ive jurors are, at the very least, predisposed to respond similarly and to contin ue 
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the suing of "no" answers when they are asked if they are adp.XC, Moreover, the questions 
about partiality and prejudice suggest that there is something wrong with being partial 
and prejudiced. Immediately following negative instructions about partiality and preju-
dice with questions about tendencies to automatically impose the death penalty effec-
tively links the two ideas. As a result, prospective jurors are likely to perceive that being 
adp is "bad," just like being partial or prejudiced is bad. As such, fearing social st igma, 
adp prospective jurors might be less willing to admit thei r desire to see all murderers 
punished by death because they believe that the court and those watch ing voir dire frown 
on such an opinion.X? Thus, some adp prospective jurors are likely to mask their feelings 
and make a simple "no" reply to the yeslno question about whether they would automati-
cally impose death. xx 
The second problem with Delaware's voir dire questions in capital cases is that 
they are neither sufficient nor clear enough to cause some adp prospective jurors to realize 
that they are adp . Delaware's adp question - Do you believe that anyone who is con-
victed of murder in the first degree should automatically be given the death penalty re-
gardless of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of rhe Court 'S 
instructions of law? - is so long-winded and vague that some adp prospective jurors 
confidently answer in the negative when, in actuality, they are in fact adp .x9 Another 
86. Sometimes jurors either are not paying attention or sim ply do not co mprehend the 
questions being posed to them. In both types of situations, after having answered "no" to a string 
of ques tions it is highly possible that prospective jurors will continue to answer "no" simply be-
cause they did not li sten to the question being asked to them or because they did not understand 
the questions and they were too embarrassed to request clarification. 
87. See supra note 81 discussing how it is much eas ier for individuals to acknowledge 
their feelings about the death penalty in a phone surveyo r an interview than in a fo rmal court-
room setting. 
88. See Valerie P Hans, The Conduct a/Voir Dire: A Psychological Analysis, 11 J UST. Sys . 
]. 40, 55 (1986). Professor Hans notes that "A yeslno format often results in the developm ent of 
automatic patterns of response. Particularly if socially appropriate answers are obvious, such re-
sponses tell us little about respondents' attitude." Professor Hans laments the usage solely ofyeslno 
questions because of their failure to uncover prospective jurors' biases. A better method, she ar-
gues, would be to intersperse close-ended and open-ended questions. 
89. Cf Luginbuhl & Howe, mpra note 80, at 1169 noting that "cap ital instructions 
also typically use complex language, unfamiliar words, one-sentence definitions of terms, and many 
sentences with multiple negatives." It is no wonder then that jurors are frequently confused about 
many difficult concepts, ranging from death and life qualification to weighi ng aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, that they are compelled to face in capital cases . 
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hypothetical example helps to illustrate this siruation. Under the Delaware questioning 
system, judges ask prospective jurors yes/no adp questions in this kind of exchange: 
Judge: Do you believe that anyone who is convicted of murder in the 
first degree should automatically be given the death penalty regardless 
of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of the 
court's instructions on the law? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
Judge: If you found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, 
would you automatically vote in favor of a sentence of death irrespec-
tive of the facts or the court's instructions of law? 
Prospective Juror: No, I would not. 
Using the Delaware questions as they now exist does not elicit any identification 
of bias from this prospective juror. However, consider what might happen if one open-
ended and more probing question were interspersed with the close-ended questions that 
are already used. 
Judge: Do you believe that anyone who is convicted of murder in the 
first degree should automatically be given the death penalty regardless 
of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of the 
Court's instructions on the law? 
Prospective Juror: No. 
Judge: Okay, you have said that you would never automatically impose a 
death sentence. How would you determine whether or not a defendant 
should be sentenced to death? 
Prospective Juror: Well, I believe in capital punishment. I think that if you 
take a lifo then you deserve to give up your lifo. There are exceptions of 
course. If the person had to kill in self-defense then I wouldn't vote for the 
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death penalty. But, unless the situation were something like that, then 1 
think murderers should be executed. 
Judge: Let me understand your views on the death penalty. Are you saying 
that if a person is convicted offirst degree murder then he should always be 
sentenced to death? 
Prospective Juror: No, if the person acted in self-defense then he doesn't 
deserve the death penalty. 
Judge: Well, if the jury found that an individual acted in self-defense then 
he would not be found guilty of first degree murder. He might be found 
guilty of a lesser charge, but not first degree murder. 90 So, if a person were 
convicted of first degree murder it is unlikely that self-defense would be 
among the mitigating circumstances. If self-defense were not an aspect of 
the case, would you automatically vote for the death penalty if the defen-
dant had been convicted of first degree murder? 
Prospective Juror: Yes, J would have to say that J would. 
Judge: Thank you for your time. I am going to excuse you from having to 
serve as a juror in this case. 
257 
As this hypothetical example demonstrates, some prospective jurors who believe 
that they would not automatically impose the death penalty would in fact do so after a 
first degree murder convictionYI By asking an open-ended question the court was able to 
90. Self-defense can be a complete justification for what otherwise would be a criminal 
action. As such, if a jury found that a defendant acted in self-defense it would acquit the defendant 
of the homicide charge. See M ODEL PENAL CODE §3.04(l) U[Tlhe use of force upon or toward 
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for 
the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the 
present occasion." 
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obta in addit io nal information that revealed the prospective juror's bias. The prospective 
juror herself did not comprehend her bias and it was only with an open-ended question 
that the court was able to make an informed judgment to strike this prospective juror for 
cause. 
The current questi ons used in Delaware to identi fy adp jurors fa il on two counts. 
Coupled with the judge's preamble, these questions lead some jurors to give the "correct" 
answer that they are not adp although they are in fac t inclined in that directi on. O ther 
juro rs, although also adp's, erroneously believe themselves to be imparti al because the 
questions posed to them are vague and close-ended, thus not fo rcing the prospective 
juro rs to address their actual beliefs about the death p~nalty and their adp predilections. 
Iv. MANLEY V. STATE: THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT'S 
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY CAPITAL VOIR DIRE 
Despite the fact that Delawa re's capital92 voir dire is inadequate to expose some 
prospective juror's biases, the Delaware Supreme Court has been unwilling to mandate an 
expanded voir dire. Recently, in Manley v. State,93 the Delaware Supreme Court was pre-
sented with a death-sentenced inmate's appeal that he was denied adequate voir dire. 
9 1. Although self~ defense would most likely not constitu te a reason fo r leni ency after a 
first degree m urder conviction, such a situation is poss ible. It is plausible th at a defendant would 
raise a sel f- defense claim in a murder trial. This cl aim could be rejected by the jury and the defen-
dant could then be found guilty of first degree murder. At the sentencing phase, despi te the fact 
that al l the ju ro rs voted for conviction, some m ay still h arbor doubts th at the defendant did in fact 
act in selfdefense. As such, despite convict ing the defendant of first degree murder, some juro rs 
m ight be unwilling to vote fo r the death penalty because of the possibility that th e defendant d id 
actually act in self-defense. Such a situation is known as res id ual doubt and it is presum ed by some 
scholars that this keeps many convicted fi rst degree murderers fro m being sentenced ro death . See 
W illi am S. Ge imer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why jurors Vote for Lift or Death: Operative Factors in 
Tim Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J . CRIM. L. 1,28 (1 988) (no ting th at "the existence of 
some degree of doubt abour the guilt of the accused was the most often recurring explanatory 
facro r in the life recommendat ion cases stud ied"). 
92. It is not only capital pract itioners who are faced with the d ifficul t task of picking a 
jury under limited voir dire. In civil cases in D elaware voir dire is nearly nonexistent. A short 
ques tionnaire probes only a prospective juror's ties ro law enforcement o r insurance companies. In 
short , civil voir dire does not even attempt to ferret out biased individ uals. 
93 . 709 A.2d 643 (Del.) , wt. denied, 1 19 S. Cr. 2 14 (I998). 
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Glossing over the serious inadequacies of capital voir dire discussed in this article, the 
Delaware Supreme Court denied Manley's appeal and affirmed his death sentence. The 
Court's lugic was severely flawed. 
Michael Manley srood trial along with David Stevenson for the murder of 
Krisropher Heath .94 This crime began when Stevenson was arrested for fraudulent use of 
a credit card ro purchase Macy's gift cerrificates;9S Stevenson was a Macy's employee at the 
time. After a number of continuances, Stevenson's trial was set for November 13, 1995.% 
On that morning, Heath, set ro be a witness in Stevenson's case, was murdered. Witnesses 
heard gunfire at approximately 7:40 a.m. Shortly after 8:00 a.m. police were on the scene 
and identified two suspects.97 After a chase, both Stevenson and his friend Manley were 
apprehended. One year ro the day after Stevenson was supposed to have gone to trial on 
fraud charges, a jury returned a guilty verdict for first degree murder for both Stevenson 
and Manley.9H Having found the defendants guilty, the jury then proceeded to recom-
mend a sentence. The jury split seven-to-five to recommend death for Manley and eight-
to-four ro recommend death for Stevenson.99 The trial judge subsequently sen tenced both 
men to death. loo 
The Delaware Supreme Court entertained a number of Manley's appellate argu-
ments, including his claim that the Superior Court had erred in refusing his request for 
more expanded voir dire. Prior ro jury selection, Manley had requested that the trial co urt 
ask more probing, open-ended questions to identify prospective jurors whose views on 
the death penalty would substantially impair their abi lity to recommend a life sentence. IOI 
The trial court rejected this request and instead asked prospective jurors: 
94. !d. at 646. 
95. [d. at 647. 
96. !d. at 648. 
97. [d. at649. 
98. !d. at 651. 
99. !d. at 646-47. 
100. !d. at 647. 
101. !d. at 653. 
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Do you believe that anyone who takes another person's life automati-
cally forfeits his right to live? In the event that the jury found either 
defendant guilty in this case of first degree murder, would you auto-
matically vote in favor of the death penalty regardless of the presence 
of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of the Court'S instruC-
tions on the law?I02 
I · nd that if The trial judge stated that no set script is used for jury se eWon a Id 
jurors' responses to the initial questions merited further probing, more questions wou 
. I· d ' voir dire be asked. 103 The Delaware Supreme Court found no fau lt with the tria JU ge s 
. . A d· J. II C h C "Th voir dire con-questlonlng. ccor Ing to ustlce Ho and, writing lOr t e ourt, e 
. I · d to ascer-ducted by the Superior Court in Manley's case was adequate for the rna JU ge 
d· to 
tain whether each prospective juror would be impartial."104 The reason, accor mg 
J . H II d h" h . . . expressed a ustlce 0 an ,was t at t e record reflects that when a prospectlve Juror 
. . II . d · . equired by 
. constltutlona y unacceptable view in response to the life-quahfie inqUiry r . 
>A" h· I · d . · ·d be impartial. morgan, t e tria JU ge asked whether the juror could set that view aSI e, 
and fo llow the court's instructions on the law."lo5 If the prospective juror could not be 
impartial he was excused for cause. 
CI I h · . Crt's blanket ear y, t IS reasoning does not support the Delaware Supreme ou 
statement that Manley's voir dire was adequate for the trial judge "to ascertain whether 
h . . Id ' . d· e procedure eac prospectlve Juror wou be impartial."lo6 Rather, the trial court s VOir Ir 
h ·d .f! db· h h ould aUto-may ave I entl Ie lased prospective jurors who outrightly stated t at t ey w 
. II C h .fy h e prospec-
matlca y vote lor t e death penalty, but it in no way was able to identl t os . 
.. . hi· . b automatiC tlve Jurors Wit atent biases who answered the simple yes/no questIOn a out 
. . . f h . M I 's case was Imposition 0 t e death penalty in the negative. In short, voir dire In an ey .t 
bl ·d .fy h airy but I a e to I entl some merciless jurors who would always vote for the deat pen , 
-----------------------------------------------
102. [d. at 653-54. 
103. [d. at 654. 
104 . !d. at 655. 
105. !d. at 654-55. 
106. [d. at 655. 
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certainly was not adequate for the trial judge "to ascertain whether each prospective juror 
w~uld be impartial."107 Unfortunately, the trial court and the Delaware Supreme Court 
~atled to take into account a prospective juror who initially answers the yes/no adp ques-
tion "corre tl " f' d . . h C h" 
ansWer. "108 
c Y out 0 error, Ignorance, or a eSlre not to gIve t e ourt t e wrong 
. The Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of the necessary scope of voir dire 
In Manley was provincial. This was due in part to the Manley Court's narrow reading of 
Morgan v. Illinois. The Manky Court interpreted Morgan as if the Supreme Court had 
Stated that life qualification only requires prospective jurors to be asked if they would 
automatically impose the death penalty. This, however, is not what the Supreme Court 
decided in Morgan. In Morgan v. Illinois, the Supreme Court made fWO things dear: First, 
the Supreme Court stated that adp jurors cannot lawfully sit on a jury. to? Second, the 
~organ COUrt held that a defendant could not be prohibited from asking prospective 
JUrors if they would automatically vote for the death penalty should they convict him. 11O 
The Morgan Court never reached the question of how expansive voir dire should be. 
Consequently, the Court has never held that one yes/no question is sufficient to identify 
adp jurors during voir dire; it has merely held that defendants are entitled to ask that 
question. 
As a result, the requisite scope of voir dire is an open question. That said, there is 
a strong constitutional argument for the need for more expansive voir dire questions in 
capital trials. 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR EXPANDED VOIR DIRE 
The hypothetical examples in Part III of this article make dear that adp pro-
spective jurors can in fact slip through the cracks to sit on juries in capital cases. The 
~UeStioll then becomes whether the possibility of adp jurors sitting on a capital jury is a 
SIgnificant enough concern to warrant a change in Delaware's voir dire procedure in capi-
------------------------------------------------------
107.ld. (emphasis added). 
lOB. SI:( supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
109. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 
1l0. ld. at 739. 
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tal trials. After all, the Constitution does not promise a defendant a perfect trial, nor does 
it promise a perfect jury. Thus, some would argue that as long as attempts are made to 
impanel jurors who would "follow the law," it is inconsequential if one or two adp jurors 
slip through the cracks and inevitably serve on a capital defendant's jury. Moreover, pro-
ponents oflimited voir dire might point out that the inverse possibility - that jurors who 
would never impose the death penalty (ndp jurors) would be impaneled - is an equally 
real and troubling likelihood. As such, there are risks that ndp as well as adp jurors might 
be impaneled and since neither situation can be remedied entirely, those opposed to ex-
panded voir dire contend that we should not expend vast amounts of judicial resources to 
accomplish the limited task of keeping a small number of biased jurors off of the vtnire. 
Though these arguments may sound convincing, they are seriously flawed. 
Even though it is usually correct to conclude that defendants are only entitled to 
an adequate trial, that logic does not easily extend to capital cases. Capital cases are marked 
by increased care for procedures and judicial scrutiny. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court struck down all existing death-penalty statutes because they operated in 
an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory fashion. II I In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the 
Court made clear that capital punishment, in and of itself, is constitutional. lI2 However, 
the Court mandated substantial procedural safeguards and an overarching substantive 
philosophy that because "death is different,"m capital trials must be conducted in a much 
more careful manner than in the past. The Court's two landmark decisions on capital 
punishment - Furman and Gregg - demonstrate a concern for fundamental fairness in 
capital trials that is absent from other contexts. The Supreme Court has never invalidated 
all existing burglary laws or made such a striking statement on the issue of life imprison-
ment. Only in dealing with capital punishment has the Court been so bold as to invali-
date the laws of over thirty states. In short, "death is different." The fact that death is 
different, then, implicitly suggests that capital voir dire should also be different. A "fair" 
voir dire, then, is not sufficient in capital cases; increased scrutiny is necessary. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court agrees that capital voir dire is of substantial impor-
tance. The Court has concluded that those individuals who would never impose the death 
penalty as well as those who would automatically impose it are unfit to serve on a capital 
Ill. Su Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
112. Su Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
113. Su Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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jury. In order to eliminate these prospective jurors, the Court has determined that ques-
tions must be asked to identify people's attitudes about capital punishment. The Supreme 
Court has decided, in Morgan v. Illinois,1I4 that defense counsel must be allowed to ask 
prospective jurors if they would automatically impose the death penalty. Morgan answered 
the narrow question of whether a defendant is entitled to ask jurors a single question 
about whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty; the Court was not 
asked to decide whether open-ended questions are required in capital voir dirt. Thus, in 
solely mandating that defendants be allowed to ask a yes/no question about prospective 
jurors' adp status, the Supreme Court simply answered the narrow question presented to 
it. However, should the Court be asked in the future to consider whether a capital peti-
tioner should be entitled to expanded voir dire, the justices should require a more thor-
ough jury selection. The reason for this is that while the single question approved in 
Morgan is a good start toward eliminating adp jurors, it is, by itself, insufficient and 
ineffective. The single question approved in Morgan, and utilized by Delaware judges, 
allows adp jurors to slip through the cracks and onto a capital jury. 
Because the adp question approved by the Court in Morgan allows adp's to be 
seated in the jury-box, it therefore does not square with the Morgan Court's reason for 
mandating the question in the first place. In other words, in Morgan, just as in Withmpoon 
and Witt, the Court mandated questioning to uncover prospective jurors' biases toward 
the death penalty. The adp questions were required because the Withmpoon line of cases 
held that biased individuals cannot sit on capital juries. Thus, the more important out-
come of Withtrspoon, Witt, and especially Morgan was not the specific language of the 
questions themselves that lower courts today utilize but, rather, the reason the questions 
were mandated in the first place. As such, it is not questions themselves that courts should 
be concerned about but, rather, whether these questions serve the purpose of the 
Withaspoon- Witt-Morgan line of cases: to eliminate biased individuals from the vmirt. 
Thus, the legacy of the Court's decision in Morgan should not be that the defense must be 
allowed to ask jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty. Rather, 
the legacy that should emanate from Morgan is that the defense is entitled to dturmint 
whether a prospective juror would automatically vote for death. 
Language from the Morgan decision itself supports the contention that the de-
fendant should be able to determine which prospective jurors are adp. In requiring that 
defendants be allowed to inquire about prospective jurors' propensity to automatically 
114. Su supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
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impose the death penalty, the Court noted that "[w]e deal here with petitioner's ability to 
exercise intelligently his complementary challenge for cause against those biased persons 
'1 "115 
on the venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death after a finding of gUI t. . 
A few paragraphs later the Court further stated that "[a] defendant on trial for his life 
must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function und~r 
[the) misconception [that they could 'follow the law' even though they would automatI-
cally vote for death]. "11(, The Court then noted that the petitioner in the instant case "wa,s 
. I d h' " d ' . h ' h . to the States enUt e , upon IS request, to mqutry zscermng t ose Jurors w 0, even pnor 
case in chief, had predetermined the terminating issue of his trial , that being whether to 
impose the death penalty. "117 
The language the Court used in Morgan is compelling. The Court did not sim-
ply state that Morgan was entitled to ask whether prospective jurors would automatically 
impose the death penalty. Rather, the Court stated that Morgan needed to be able to 
exercise his challenges for cause intelligently. In order for Morgan to do this, he needed to 
be entitled to inquiry discerning prospective jurors' views on the death penalty so that he 
could ascertain which prospective jurors were adp. This language is extremely forceful and 
provides the Court with a basis - should it hear another adp case _ to move beyond the 
h ld' . A'{ • 'ty to ask narrow 0 109 In morgan In order to provide defendants with. the opportUnl 
multiple open-ended questions to probe for bias. 
VI. THE ADP PROBLEM IN DELAWARE: 
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE 
In the death-penalty states that provide for juries to sentence defendants, voir 
d ' '. '. _ended tre IS an Important tool used to Impanel an impartial jury. In these states, open 
voir dire questions designed to identify adp prospective jurors are crucial. However, per-
h . .. I h ' . he four 
aps surpnsmg y, t e Importance of open-ended questions is even greater tn t 
------------------------------------------------
115. Morgan. 504 U.S . at 733 (emphasis added). 
116. [d. at 735-36 (emphasis added) . 
117. [d. at 736 (emphasis added) . 
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recommending states - Alabama, Delaware, 11K Florida, and Indiana - where juries only 
recommend sentences. In these states, a more in-depth voir dire may exclude one prospec-
tive adp juror who would otherwise have served on a capital jury and thus effectively 
change the number of jurors voting for death. In turn, this might change the sentence 
eventually imposed by the judge. This is especially true in Delaware, as a hypothetical 
example will demonstrate. 
In a capital murder trial, eleven impartial jurors are impaneled along with one 
~dp juror. Of the eleven impartial jurors, all of whom weigh the aggravating and mitigat-
~ng circumstances with an open mind, six jurors vote for death and five vote for life 
Imprisonment. Obviously, the adp juror - the twelfth juror - votes for the death pen-
alty, thus bringing the tally to seven-to-five in favor of death. In Delaware, judges rypi-
cally defer to juries' recommendations I I ? and in this case the judge may very well impose 
a sentence of death because a majority of the jury voted for the death penalty.12() 
---------------------------------------------
D 118. Of all four of these states, open-ended questions have the best chance of success in 
h elaware because Delaware judges, when imposing sentences, seem to be the most responsive to 
t e recommendations of the capital juries. Su infra text accompanying note 121 . 
' . 119. In some cases, however, Delaware judges have imposed life sentences even when a 
J
rnaJoCIty of the jury voted for death. Juries recommended the death penalty for Donald Simmons, 
OSe Rd' d 7 0 nguez, John Watson, Arthur Dovan, and Luis Cabrera by votes of 10-2,9-3, 8-4,8-4 an 
-5, respectively, but trial judges nevertheless imposed life imprisonment. Su Church, supra note 
8, Cataloging all of Delaware's capital cases since 1991. 
h 120. Even though I have hypothesized that Delaware judges are more likely to impose 
t e ~e~th penalty if a majority of the jury voted for death, it is important to note that this is not an 
ernplClcal hypothesis. To the best of the author's knowledge, no empirical study has yet been done 
~o deterrnine whether there is a significant correlation between the number of jurors voting for the 
eath penalty in a given case and the judge's decision to impose capital punishment. This type of 
~tudy would undoubtedly be useful. In the absence of such a study, however, the possibility that a 
!udge will be more likely to impose the death penalty when a majority of the jury recommends it 
IS nOt foreclosed. Although it may only be coincidental that Delaware judges have failed to impose 
a ~eath sentence when less than a majority of the jury recommends the death penalty, conventional 
wlsdorn suggests otherwise. Given the numerous capital trials during the last decade, it seems 
unlikely that coincidence would keep Delaware from joining the ranks of the other recommending 
~tates in which jury recommendations for life sentences have frequently been overturned by judges ~n f~vor of death sentences. Su infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text discllssing the numer-
. u~ IOStances in which Alabama, Florida, and Indiana judges have imposed the death penalty after 
JUnes recornmended life sentences. 
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Now consider what might have happened had the adp juror not been impan-
eled. The eleven impartial jurors still would have been seated and they again would have 
split six-to-five in favor of death. However, unlike the first example, this time the adp 
juror did not slip through the cracks. The defense was able to ask the prospective juror 
open-ended questions, the prospective juror's bias was uncovered, and he was subsequently 
excused for cause. In place of the adp juror, an impartial juror, who was able to weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, was impaneled. The impartial juror, then, after care-
fully considering the evidence, voted for life imprisonment, thus bringing the jury to an 
even six-to-six split over the punishment to be imposed. The elimination of the adp juror 
thus also eliminated a majority vote by the jury for the death penalty. In Delaware, judges 
have yet to use their override power to impose a death sentence when less than a majority 
of the jury has voted for death. In fact, in all three cases in which Delaware capital juries 
split six-to-six between recommending life sentences or the death penalty, the judges 
imposed life sentences. 121 Accordingly, under this hypothesis, the judge in this hypotheti-
cal case is less likely to impose the death penalty. As a result, the elimination of one adp 
juror in this hypothetical example served to change the jury's sentencing vote and might 
have led a judge to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. 
This hypothetical example is particularly relevant to Delaware. In Florida, judges 
frequently overrule juries' recommendations for life imprisonment in order to impose the 
death penalty; in fact, they have done so on over a hundred occasions.122 In Alabama, 
judges have imposed death nearly fifty times after a majority of a juty recommended that 
the punishment should be life imprisonment.123 Although with less frequency, judges in 
Indiana have also overruled juries' recommendations for life imprisonment in order to 
impose the death penalty. 124 Of the four recommending states, only Delaware judges have 
121 . Su Church, supra note 8, describing the cases of James Crowe, Antonio Taylor, and 
Charles Ta'Owbridge. Interestingly, Church notes that in Crowe's case, Judge Jerome O. Herlihy 
cited the jury's six-to-six split sentencing recommendation as a reason to impose life imprison-
ment. 
122. Su Radelet & Mello, supra note 7, at 196. 
123. Su Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,513 (1995) (citing the Alabama Prison Project) . 
124. Su Harris, 513 U.S. at 522 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing a memorandum 
from the Indiana Public Defender's Council). 
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declined to sentence a defendant to death when a jury has voted for life. However, when 
a majority of jurors have voted for the death penalty, even a slim majority, Delaware 
judges have sentenced defendants to death. m Thus, at least in Delaware, the difference 
between a seven-co-five vote for the death penalty as opposed to a split decision or a 
majority vote for life imprisonment may be the difference between life and death. Justice 
Scalia, therefore, could not have been more wrong in his Morgan dissent when he stated 
that "[a] single death penalty opponent can block that punishment [the death penalty], 
but 11 unwavering advocates cannot impose it."126 Although Justice Scalia was making a 
reference co Illinois, one of the twenty-eight states where juries pronounce the final sen-
tence in capital cases, his logic does not hold for the four recommending states, especially 
Delaware. If the assumption that Delaware judges base their sentencing decisions in large 
part on the recommendations of a majority of the jury is true, then eleven unwavering 
advocates can impose a death sentence.127 In fact, the votes of seven out of twelve jurors 
are sufficient in some cases to garner a death sentence for a defendant in Delaware. 12H 
Thus, given Delaware judges' track record of not imposing death sentences without a 
majority recommendation from the jury, if an adp juror is impaneled and the jury voted 
seven-to-five in favor of the death penalty, then that adp juror can arguably be seen as the 
final sentencer who single-handedly sent a defendant to death row. Clearly, such a situa-
tion is unacceptable and expanded voir dirt is therefore necessary to avoid it. 
125. See Manley v. State, 709 A.2d 643 (Del.), em. dmitd, 119 S. Ct. 214 (1998) and 
Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994), in which judges imposed the death penalty after 
juries voted seven-to-five to recommend death. 
126. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J .. dissenting). 
127. Delaware judges have imposed the death penalty after eleven-to-one jury recom-
mendations for death. See Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); Jackson v. State. 643 A.2d 
1360 (Del. 1994). This of course is not to suggest that those eleven-to-one juries were composed 
of "unwavering advocates" but. rather. to demonstrate that a single juror opposed to a death sen-
tence cannot stop such a result. 
128. See supra note 125. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
. ansWer the 
It is a basic principle of American law that appellate courtS Sit to . 
. . S C t is certatnly no 
most narrow question posed to them. The Umted States upreme our c h h deleo-
exception to this rule. In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court was only asked whet er t e h 
dant had the right to ask a single adp question; it thus remains an open question whe~ ~r 
. . d' ., b d d . . I s in order to ellm l -
more expansive votr Ire question 109 can e man ate 10 capita case 
nate adp's from the jury pool. Since Morgan, the United States Supreme Court has oot 
. I However 
heard another case about the need for more expansive voir dire in capita cases. 
5 129 the Delaware the Delaware Supreme Court has heard such a case. In Manley v. tate, . I 
. d y of capita 
Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of adp's and the lOa equac . a 
voir dire in a case in which a defendant was sentenced to death by a judge following 
S me Court 
seven-to-five jury vote for the death penalty. Unfortunately, the Delaware upre 
d
'd i ' ital sent ene-
I not com pre end the importance an adp juror can potentially p ay 10 cap . 
. d h ., d . d dequate votr 
109 an t e Court rejected Manleys contention that he had been eme a 
dire. 1311 
Th
' . f . . . Delaware. A 
e situation 0 lOadequate capital voir dire therefore remams m 
. I / d . . . ' h h a prospee-
slOg e yes no a p question continues to be the sole baSIS to determme w et er . 
. . Id . I . nee studies 
tlve Juror wou automatically vote for the death penalty. Despite SOCia SCle . 
. d ' . . II . . . . which adp 
10 Icatlng a potentia y high percentage of adp's and frequent situations In 
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129. Su supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text. 
130 S
· I . ,. , . . b en challenged. 
. mce Man 'Y, the defects 10 Delaware s capital VOlT dzre have agalO e . cd 
Set State v. Wright, Cr. A. No. IN91-04-1947R2 et al. (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 1998). ~rig~t :;~ in 
many of the same issues of inadequate voir dire that the Delaware Supreme Court ha reJe~ d by 
Manl'Y' In Wright, however, the Superior Court was forced to contend with testimony pro
vl
: r 
D Val . H . al . I' t'ce Prolesso 
r. ene ans, a nation Iy recognized jury expert and professor of crimma .Ju~ I . ' ues-
Hans noted five flaws in the voir dire process in Wright's case. First, the life-quallfylOg (adp)l
q 
d 
. k d f I d comp Icate 
tlon was as e out 0 context. Second, the life-qualifying question was toO ong an d nd ~ . h d Th' d . . s were use a 
or Jurors to compre en. Ir, mstead of open-ended questions, yes/no question F th, 
th . . cc' . d h enalty. our 
esc questions were menectlve to discern prospective juror's views on the eat P of 
the phrase "intentional murder" was likely misunderstood by prospective jurors. Finally, thebuse -
. I d . c'l d I uld su stan 
a SlOg e a p question lal e to weed out jurors whose views about the death pena ty wo C un 
tially impair their ability to recommend a life sentence. [d. at 30-34. Unfortunately, ~he , 0 se 
dismissed Professor Hans' concerns as unfounded and determined that voir dire in WrightS ca 
was not flawed. 
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jurors incorrectly answer the death-penalty questions posed to them, Delaware continues 
to Utilize a minimalist and inadequate voir dire process. A court's failure to use open-
ended questions to probe for prospective jurors' capital punishment opinions and biases 
is dangerous because it almost certainly allows adp jurors to be overlooked and placed in 
the jury-box. More problematic, though, is that this danger is intensified in Delaware, 
where a single adp juror may be the swing vote in a majority vote for the death penalty 
that might lead a judge to impose death. It is unfortunate that the Delaware Supreme 
COUrt has failed to realize the peril capital defendants face as a result oflimited voir dire. 
It falls then to the United States Supreme Court to remedy this inadequacy by mandating 
that defendants be allowed to ask more probing, open-ended questions during capital 
voir dire. 
